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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ting the insured on notice of the exclusion, the question of con-
tract coverage would be answered, and the deterrent effect of
punitive damages would increase since the insured would be
aware of the personal repercussions of recklessness and wanton
misconduct.57
Labor Law: Authority of the Judiciary
To Review Arbitration
Plaintiff-union brought an action under section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act" for specific performance
of an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court of Iowa held2 that the union's right to com-
pel the employer to arbitrate grievances was waived by the
union's breach of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining
agreement.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the union's alleged breach of the no-strike clause did
not relieve the employer of its duty under that agreement to
arbitrate, and remanded to the Iowa Supreme Court for further
from a voluntary exclusion in the face of competition that made no such
limitation upon coverage in its contract. See APPLEmAN § 4312, at 137.
On the other hand, it might be argued that insurers would not worry
that the inclusion of such a disclaimer would affect salability since
they are aware of the fact that most customers probably do not choose
a certain company by comparing provisions of standard policies but
rather by comparing rates, reputation for service, and attractiveness
and salesmanship of the agents.
57. While this statute would be the answer to the coverage ques-
tion within that particular state, it would not solve the problem of
punitive damages levied against an out-of-state driver whose insurance
contract does not specifically exclude coverage of punitive damages
because he is from a jurisdiction where such a statute is not in effect.
In this situation, the public policy issue as articulated in the instant
case would seem to override the problem of lack of notice to the driver.
Although the statutory policy of placing the burden upon the tortfeasor
might be considered a burden upon interstate commerce since the
crossing of a state line would be a risky venture for the driver in terms
of the possibility of having to shoulder a heavy punitive judgment in
the event of an accident, the public safety policy of punishing and de-
terring recklessness swings the balance in favor of the state. Cf. Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
2. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 254 Iowa 882, 119 N.W.2d 141 (1963).
3. As interpreted, § 301 (a) provides for state and federal courts as
alternative forums in such an action, but requires federal law be applied.
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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proceedings. 4 In accordance with the remand order, an arbi-
tration hearing was held. The arbitrator found for the union
indicating that although the union had breached the no-strike
clause of the collective bargaining agreement, the repudiation
had been caused by the company's violation of the contract.5
The company appealed the district court's judgment enforcing
the award. The Iowa Supreme Court held that because the col-
lective bargaining agreement did not provide for arbitration of a
dispute over employees' rights to return to work, the arbitrator's
award was "beyond his jurisdiction and the extent of his au-
thority." Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham
Packing Company, 151 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 1967), cert. denied, 389
U. S. 830 (1967).
At common law, agreements to arbitrate were not specifi-
cally enforceable. 6 Statutory inroads on this doctrine began in
the 1920's when various state statutes were passed authorizing
courts to order specific performance for breaches of certain
types of arbitration agreements. 7 Although the Federal Arbi-
tration Act s conveyed similar power to the federal courts in 1925,
its application was severely limited by excluding "contracts of
employment of... any... class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce."9 Finally, enactment in 1947 of section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act enabled litigants
to sue in any appropriate federal court for violation of a
4. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
5. There were actually two disputes. The union steward shut
down the production line over a minor grievance, and was subse-
quently fired. A strike by the other workers attempting to force the
company to rehire him followed. After negotiations between the
company and the union, which the arbitrator found resulted in an agree-
ment to take the workers back with full seniority, the union voted to
return to work. After the union vote, the company refused to accept
any of the strikers back except on a new hire basis with no seniority.
The union then attempted to arbitrate the discharge of the steward
and the reinstatement of the strikers. The arbitrator denied the
union's first grievance, but granted the second. See the arbitrator's
opinion for a more complete exposition of the facts. 44 Lab. Arb. 1057
(1965).
6. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22
(1924).
7. Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration,
30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 247, 250 (1958).
8. 43 Stat. 883 (1925), as amended, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The authorities are divided on whether
this language included the collective bargaining agreement. Compare
Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d
Cir. 1951), with Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co.,
233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), alf'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
1968] 1119
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
collective bargaining agreement. However, the federal courts
were not clearly given independent statutory jurisdiction to
compel specific performance of the arbitration clauses in collec-
tive bargaining contracts 0 until Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills.',
In Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court held that section 301
(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act was both juris-
dictional and substantive in nature. After examining the legis-
lative history of the Act, the Court concluded that Congress had
intended to stabilize industrial relations by making collective
bargaining contracts equally binding and enforceable on both
parties. From this conclusion the Court reasoned that the Act
required a body of federal law to cope with the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, including the essential power to
order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate griev-
ances.12 Having established the authority of the courts to deal
with the question of arbitration, the Supreme Court undertook
to define the scope of that authority in a series of actions brought
by the United Steelworkers. 13 In these cases the Supreme
Court outlined a very limited role for the judiciary in suits either
to determine arbitrability or to enforce or vacate an arbitrator's
award.
In the initial case, United Steelworkers v. American Manu-
facturing Company,14 the Court concluded that since the parties
had bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract,
the courts have no business examinhag the merits of a grievance
to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support arbitra-
10. Prior to Lincoln Mills there had been two views on the effect
of § 301(a). One group of courts viewed it as merely giving federaljurisdiction. See United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co.,
241 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1957); Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers
Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951). The second group, leading the
way for the Supreme Court, held § 301 (a) to be both jurisdictional and
substantive. See Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills, 193 F.2d 529,
533 (4th Cir. 1951); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers
Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950); Textile Workers Union v. Ameri-
can Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
11. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
12. Id. at 456-57.
13. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
see generally Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective
Bargaining, 28 U. CHr. L. REv. 464 (1961); Smith & Jones, The Supreme
Court and Labor Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH.
L. REv. 751 (1965).
14. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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tion of the claim.16 In the second of the steelworkers cases,
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company,1 6
the Court took a positive approach by attempting to establish
limitations beyond which the judiciary could not inquire in de-
termining whether a particular grievance claim was arbitrable.
The Court imposed the severe restraint that only if the arbitra-
tion agreement were not even "susceptible" of an interpretation
which would cover the particular grievance could the courts
refuse to grant the order to arbitrate.17 Finally, in United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation,8 the Court
dealt with the scope of judicial review in actions to enforce or
vacate the arbitrator's award. The Court reiterated its view,
stated in both American and Warrior, that the judiciary should
refrain from reviewing the merits of arbitration. 9 Since the
collective bargaining agreement establishes the arbitrator's de-
termination as the final step in the grievance procedure, the
Court pointed out that judicial review of the merits of an arbi-
trator's award would, in effect, substitute a subsequent judicial
determination. Such a substitution would directly contravene
both the letter and the spirit of the contract and cannot be
allowed.20
Although the general theme of Enterprise Wheel is auton-
omy for the arbitrator, the opinion places one restriction on his
authority which the courts have used to justify review of arbi-
tration awards.2 ' The Court stated that the arbitrator must
base his award on the language of the collective bargaining
agreement; if he fails to do so the courts cannot enforce the
award.2 2  However, even this restriction is attenuated by the
15. Id. at 568.
16. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
17. Id. at 582.
18. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
19. Id. at 596. The main thrust of the policies stated in American
and Warrior is the establishment of stable industrial self-government.
Stabilization is sought in order to bring about the common goal of un-
interrupted production. Furthermore, industrial relations is such a
specialized area that only the professional arbitrator is capable of sup-
plying the expertise necessary to handle the problems in the area. See
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-84 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
20. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 599 (1960).
21. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, Local 1645,
362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966); Local 787, Elec. Workers v. Collins Radio
Co., 317 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963).
22. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960).
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Court's admonition that an ambiguity in the opinion accompany-
ing the arbitrator's award which "permits the inference that the
arbitrator may have exceeded his authority" is not sufficient
grounds for refusal to enforce the award.
23
The relationship between an arbitration agreement and a
no-strike clause was specifically dealt with in Drake Bakeries v.
Local 50, American Bakery Workers,24 where the Supreme Court
held that a breach of the no-strike clause by the union did not
relieve the company of its duty to arbitrate.2r The Court rea-
soned that unless specifically excluded, disputes concerning
breaches of a no-strike clause came within the arbitration pro-
vision; hence, the company would be discharged from its duty to
arbitrate only where it was clear that the union had totally
and irrevocably breached the arbitration clause..
2 6
In the original suit brought by the union against Needham
to enforce its right to arbitrate, the Supreme Court cited Drake
Bakeries as dispositive.2 7  The Court stated that the union's
claim of wrongful discharge was obviously within the scope of
the arbitration clause and that nothing in the agreement ex-
cluded disputes which followed an alleged breach of the no-
strike clause.
28
In the instant case, the arbitrator found that a preliminary
agreement had been reached between the union and the com-
pany concerning the return to work of the strikers. He also
found that the company had breached the collective bargaining
contract by repudiating this agreement after the strikers had
voted to return to their jobs. In reviewing the arbitrator's
decision, the Iowa Supreme Court deduced from the United
Steelworkers cases that re-examination of the merits of the
grievance is beyond the scope of its authority and that it must
determine the question of arbitrability on the basis of the arbi-
trator's findings and conclusions. On that examination, the court
concluded that the arbitrator's decision was based upon the
negotiations and alleged agreement made subsequent to the
strike, and therefore was beyond his jurisdiction and authority.
In support of this conclusion, the Iowa court argued that
23. Id. at 598.
24. 370 U.S. 254 (1962). See 17 SyLcusE L. REV. 57 (1965).
25. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
26. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers,
370 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1962).
27. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 376 U.S. 247, 250 (1964).
28. Id. at 252.
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the labor contract contained no provisions applicable to a dispute
over the return to work after an illegal strike. The court stated
that the primary reason the employer includes the arbitration
clause in the contract is to obtain a no-strike clause insuring
uninterrupted production. However, since the illegal strike
makes this impossible, it cannot be implied that the arbitration
clause was intended to include an agreement to arbitrate the
return to work after an illegal strike.
A close reading of the court's opinion indicates that the ex-
tensive quotation from the United Steelworkers cases is noth-
ing more than an attempt to satisfy the Supreme Court's man-
date. The court correctly noted that the United Steelworkers
cases forbid re-examination of the merits of the grievance, but
nevertheless proceeded to a close and critical examination of the
arbitrator's findings and conclusions. Since the findings and
conclusions of the arbitrator cover all the relevant matters of
the controversy, the court, in effect, re-examined the merits of
the case. As a result, the court determined that the arbitrator's
finding that the company had broken a post-strike agreement
was not based on the collective bargaining contract.29 It thereby
used its own construction of the arbitrator's findings to con-
clude that he lacked authority, rather than accepting the arbi-
trator's construction of the contract and his findings as re-
quired by Enterprise Wheel.30
The court was correct in relying on the language in Enter-
prise Wheel that the arbitrator's decision must be based on the
collective bargaining agreement. 31 However, it is arguable that
the arbitrator's decision was based on the collective bargaining
contract. The arbitrator reported that the company's actions
were tantamount to discharging the entire bargaining unit
through the improper means of a total deprivation of seniority
in contravention of the collective bargaining contract.3 2 Appar-
29. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 151 N.W.2d 540, 549-50 (Iowa 1967).
30. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960).
31. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
32. The arbitrator emphasized that the union's actions did not
constitute a total repudiation of the original collective bargaining
agreement and related the breach of the return to work agreement by
the company to the original labor contract by finding that this reversal
of position by the company constituted "a violation of contract because
* . . [it was a] . . . blunt and manifestly improper use of total seniority
right deprivation rather then [sic] disciplinary action as such." 44 Lab.
Arb. 1057, 1098 (1965). This violation was based on paragraph 8 of the
collective bargaining agreement which gave management the power
19681 1123
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ently the Iowa court did not consider this conclusion sufficient
to bring the union's claim within the arbitration clause, but it
seems clear from Enterprise Wheel that disagreement over con-
tract construction, where the arbitrator's construction is at least
arguable, is an insufficient ground to refuse to enforce an award.
33
In addition to finding that the award was not enforceable
due to this defect, the court stated that the finding of arbitrabil-
ity "is inconsistent with many of the other findings and the
conclusions of the arbitrator. '34 Thus the court is equating a
finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority with the con-
clusion that the controversy was not arbitrable.35 This transi-
tion from finding that the arbitrator lacked authority to make
the particular award to a determination of nonarbitrability lacks
any justification or authority in the opinion and appears to be
merely an attempt to circumvent the prior decisions of the Su-
preme Court.
Finally, the court's policy argument that the arbitration
clause was not intended to apply to a controversy concerning
return to work should be seriously questioned. The court ap-
pears to have restated and refined the quid pro quo3" reasoning
of their original decision holding the controversy was not ar-
to ". . hire, suspend, or discharge for just cause... ," provided that
these powers were not used "for the purpose of discrimination against
any employee or to avoid any of the provisions of this agreement."
Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 151
N.W.2d 540, 544 (Iowa 1967). See 44 Lab. Arb. 1057, 1091-100 (1965).
33. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960), the Supreme Court stated:
As we . . . emphasized, the question of interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbi-
trator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained
for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction
of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him be-
cause their interpretation of the contract is different from his.
Id. at 599.
34. 151 N.W.2d at 550 (Iowa 1967).
35. The dissent made the argument that the majority's reasoning is
faulty and had been rejected by the Supreme Court although it did not
point out that the contexts in which these arguments have been rejected
are different from the present case. Id. at 550.
36. The quid pro quo reasoning briefly stated is that the no-strike
clause and the arbitration clause are mutually dependent, so that the
breach of one discharges the other. This argument finds some support
in the language of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 455 (1957), and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567 (1960). In the present case the court restates this reasoning
in a more narrow form by arguing that the illegal strike relieves the
company of the duty to arbitrate over the strike stressing that the
policy behind the arbitration clause of uninterrupted production is not
achievable once the strike occurs. 151 N.W.2d at 550 (Iowa 1967).
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bitrable.37 The basic quid pro quo reasoning was, however,
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Drake Bakeries38
and again in reversing the Iowa Court's original Needham deci-
sion.39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
the arbitration clause continued to exist after the breach of
the no-strike clause and, therefore, the company was bound to
arbitrate the union's claims.40
The broad question which this case thus poses is the scope
of the power to review an arbitrator's award granted to the
courts by the language in Enterprise Wheel. The Iowa court
has apparently adopted the position that this language is to be
broadly construed, permitting it to review the findings and con-
clusions of the arbitrator to insure that those conclusions and
findings are consistent with the court's construction of the con-
tract.
While the relevant language in Enterprise Wheel is un-
fortunately ambiguous and general, it would seem the inter-
pretation of this language most consistent with the position of
the Supreme Court would result in a much narrower scope of
review. Since the Court's position is that the judiciary should
not be allowed to review the merits of the arbitration claim, it
is then inconsistent to interpret the grant of judicial authority
as permitting the courts to achieve the same result through a
review of the findings and conclusions of the arbitrator.
The scope of review consistent with both this language in
Enterprise Wheel and with the Court's general position on arbi-
tration would be to determine only if the arbitrator's words
were consistent with his obligation to act within the terms of the
contract. The crucial question in this test would not be whether
his conclusions followed from the contract as interpreted by a
court, but rather whether the arbitrator's findings and con-
clusions are connected by his logic to the contract.41 While this
37. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 254 Iowa 882, 885, 119 N.W.2d 141, 143 (1963).
38. 370 U.S. 254, 261 (1962).
39. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 376 U.S. 247, 251 (1964).
40. Id. at 252.
41. This approach to judicial power of review would give arbi-
tration approximately the finality it had under common law where the
courts could not set aside an arbitrator's award except for fraud; cor-
ruption, or mistake so great as to amount to fraud. The arbitrator's
decision was final on all questions of fact and law even though wrong.
See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
RocKY MT. L. REV. 247 (1958).
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